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ESSAYS 
INSURANCE AT THE ENERGY-WATER NEXUS 
Donald T. Hornstein * 
INTRODUCTION 
As the outstanding contributions to this symposium demon-
strate, the on-the-ground connections between water and energy 
are pervasive, multidimensional, and sobering. And, at the legal 
nexus between water and energy, the symposium’s contributors 
generally hint at some mix of land-use controls, common-law lia-
bility, or regulation to help mediate the challenges. Yet precisely 
because the challenges are so sobering, perhaps an even broader 
range of social institutions and solutions ought to be considered. 
In this essay, I offer some observations of the role that insurance 
may play at the energy-water nexus. 
In so doing, this essay reflects a vantage point familiar to those 
who follow the insurance-as-society
1
 or insurance-as-governance
2
 
literatures. The premise of this body of work is that the institu-
* Aubrey L. Brooks Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
Even though my experience with insurance and weather comes partly from my role as an 
appointed public member of the North Carolina Wind Pool, a $400 million insurance facili-
ty, the views expressed in this essay do not in any way reflect the views of the Wind Pool 
or even my own views when operating as a member of the Wind Pool’s Board of Directors. 
1. See, e.g., Deborah Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity,
in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CULTURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 52, 54 
(Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002) (describing insurance as a social system of link-
ing oneself to the risks of harm faced by others); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy 
as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1498–1500 
(2010) (describing the widespread need for insurance as a precondition for engaging in a 
wide array of social and economic activities).  
2. See, e.g., RICHARD V. ERICSON ET AL., INSURANCE AS GOVERNANCE 47–49 (2003)
(describing insurance as, among other things, a system to classify, allocate, and manage 
risk).  
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tion of insurance operates to embed individuals into social pools 
of similarly situated insureds, thereby reinforcing various types 
of social norms, and to incentivize certain actions, thereby regu-
lating the behavior of insureds. Under this conception, insurance 
slips the bridle of a mere bilateral contract between insured and 
insurer, and “functions like government by influencing policy-
holders’ conduct and protecting them against misfortune.”
3
 
I. THE INSURANCE-ENERGY NEXUS: LIABILITY INSURANCE
 For many, hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) is near the epicen-
ter of the energy-water debate. In part, this is due to the novel 
risks of water contamination by fracking fluids,
4
 to the contami-
nation of water wells with methane,
5
 and to dangers to water 
supplies from fracking fluid waste treatment via underground in-
jection wells or surface sewage treatment facilities.
6
 And, in part, 
the salience of fracking to the energy-water nexus comes from the 
speed with which hydraulic fracturing has spread across the 
United States, especially for the production of natural gas. Due to 
fracking, natural gas production in the United States has in-
creased by 25% since 2008.
7
 
To some extent, reliance on insurance-as-governance as to 
fracking stems from the scattered and fragile regulatory appa-
ratus that has, in recent years, tried to keep up with develop-
ments on the ground. As Columbia law professors Thomas Merrill 
and Dean David Schizer conclude in their recent survey of the 
regulatory environment, “[g]iven the traditional primacy of states 
in oil and gas regulation, federal law has little to say about frac-
turing,”
8
 and, as to state and local government regulation, “[s]ince 
3. Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 684
(2013). 
4. See Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution,
Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 
145, 180–92 (2013) (discussing migration of fracking fluid through subsurface creeks, sur-
face spills, risks due to the surface storage of flow-back and produced water, risks to 
groundwater from leakage of frack fluids through cracked well casings, and blowouts). 
5. Id. at 192–93.
6. Id. at 195–96.
7. Id. at 154 (citing 1 IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, AMERICA’S NEW ENERGY FUTURE: THE 
UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS REVOLUTION AND THE US ECONOMY 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.energyxxi.org/sites/default/files/pdf/americas_new_energy_future-unconventio 
nal_oil_and_gas.pdf). 
8. Id. at 200. In addition, Merrill and Schizer note that fracking-related wastes enjoy
exemptions from the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Safe Drinking 
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fracturing [is] . . . [a] relatively new practice[], it is not surprising 
that regulatory regimes governing [it] are not fully developed.”
9
 
 Precisely because of the still-emerging, chaotic regulatory en-
vironment, not to mention such common regulatory pathologies 
as incomplete information and capture, law professors David Da-
na and Hannah Wiseman take a page from the insurance-as-
governance playbook and call for increased use of insurance as a 
“market-based” approach to hydraulic fracturing.
10
 They argue 
that: 
 [Where regulatory regimes] are constrained by possible “capture” 
and insufficient enforcement resources, insurance can help fill in the 
monitoring and enforcement gap by bringing to bear another regula-
tory force—private insurance companies—that cannot be captured in 
the way legislators or agencies can be and that are not constrained 
by the pathologies of the budgetary appropriations processes.
11
To guard against adverse selection in their proposed regime—
the danger that only high-risk fracking companies would obtain 
the requisite liability/remediation insurance—Dana and Wise-
man propose that government compel all companies with frack-
ing-related operations to purchase the insurance.
12
 
 How should one approach the Dana/Wiseman proposal? To 
begin, one needs to consider the risks of moral hazard in any in-
surance-as-regulation regime—the danger that insureds will ac-
tually increase risky behavior precisely because they have insur-
ance.
13
 There are a variety of design features that insurers use to 
counteract moral hazard: deductibles and co-payments so that in-
sureds have first-dollar “skin in the game,” exclusions of particu-
larly risky or intentional behavior, and overall maximum dollar 
Water Act, and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. Id. at 200–
01.  
9. Id. at 197.
10. See David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the
Energy Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of 
Hydraulic Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 3, 10), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2353061. 
11. Id. at 21.
12. Id. at 35.
13. See, e.g., Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237,
241–44 (1996) (discussing the development of the “moral hazard” concept); Steven Shavell, 
On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541, 541–42 (1979) (discussing the ten-
dency of insurance protection to change a person’s motive to prevent loss); cf. Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 
961 (1963) (discussing the effects of medical insurance on incentives).  
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limits on an insurer’s duty to indemnify. Properly designed, the 
goal is for insurance to institutionalize loss prevention by in-
sureds by incentivizing risk-reduction behavior via premium price 
differentiation and the ability to demand written representations 
by insureds of risk-reduction commitments and procedures. 
Based on design features such as these, Dana and Wiseman state: 
“‘Insurers’ are thus ‘strategically well placed to gather infor-
mation and engage in risk management, and reflect these costs 
through premium differentiation.’”
14
 
 But this is not to say that liability insurance always delivers 
risk reduction in practice. In a recent study on the risk-reduction 
achievements of directors’ & officers’ (“D&O”) liability insurance, 
Tom Baker and Sean Griffith are decidedly lukewarm, if not out-
right critical: 
 Do insurers offer loss prevention services to their corporate in-
sureds? And, relatedly, do insurers monitor the corporate governance 
of their insureds? We found that the answer to both of these ques-
tions was: they do not. The participants in our study unanimously 
reported that D&O insurers do not offer real loss prevention services 
or otherwise monitor corporate governance.
15
On the other hand, Dana and Wiseman report on a much more 
hopeful study, by Haitao Yin, Howard Kunreuther, and Matthew 
White, finding a “dramatic decline in leaks from underground fuel 
tanks . . . when gas stations were required to carry private clean-
up and liability insurance.”
16
 That study found that “the price 
structure for market-based insurance gives [gas] tank owners 
economic incentives to invest in equipment that reduces the 
chance of accidental fuel tank leaks.”
17
 The results of these two 
studies are not necessarily in conflict, as the D&O study focused 
on the effects of insurance-induced monitoring while the gas sta-
tion study focused on the effects of insurance price differentia-
tion.
18
 
14. Dana & Wiseman, supra note 10, at 37 (quoting BENJAMIN J. RICHARDSON,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION THROUGH FINANCIAL ORGANISATIONS: COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE INDUSTRIALISED NATIONS 363 (2002)).  
15. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The
Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1798–99 (2007). 
16. Dana & Wiseman, supra note 10, at 38 (citing Haitao Yin et al., Does Private In-
surance Reduce Environmental Accidents?, REGULATION, Summer 2012, at 36, 37, availa-
ble at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2012/8/v35n2-5.pdf. 
17. Haitao Yin et al., supra note 16, at 37.
18. Yet Baker and Griffith also reported in another article on the risk-reduction bene-
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 Thus, perhaps the best one can say as to hydraulic fracturing, 
at least as a matter of theory, is that it is possible, even if not as-
sured, that a system of mandatory liability insurance may add 
value to the regulatory regimes that are emerging at the energy-
water nexus. That said, as a matter of practice, the current role of 
liability insurance in hydraulic fracturing is highly uncertain. To 
begin, unlike the recommendation made by Dana and Wiseman, 
only one state currently mandates the purchase of liability insur-
ance for those engaged in fracking.
19
 And the extent of voluntary 
insurance penetration among drillers is not entirely clear. The 
Center for Insurance Policy and Research, of the National Associ-
ation of Insurance Commissioners, reports that, “[m]ost drilling 
companies carry commercial general liability insurance (CGL), 
which protects them against third-party bodily injury and proper-
ty damage claims.”
20
 Yet, even aside from questions of coverage in 
the standard CGL policy, at least one industry risk-management 
newsletter refers to “hundreds of small companies active in shale 
gas production with typically minimal pollution liability cover-
age” and the use of “site-specific LLC/LLP corporations that are 
dissolved after operations are completed.”
21
 On the supply side, at 
least one major insurer, Nationwide Insurance Company, an-
nounced in 2012, “[a]fter months of research and discussion, we 
have determined that the exposures presented by hydraulic frac-
turing are too great to ignore. . . . [and] are now prohibited for 
[Nationwide CGL and other Nationwide policies].”
22
 And, alt-
hough not directly affecting the availability of primary coverage, 
fits of D&O price differentiation and found that, although D&O insurers did attempt to 
price on the basis of risk, “the highly discretionary nature of the D&O insurance under-
writing process and the competitive pressures of the insurance underwriting cycle limit 
the ability of corporate and securities law deterrence objectives to be fully reflected in the 
pricing of D&O insurance.” Baker & Griffith, supra note 15, at 1798 (citing Tom Baker & 
Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from the Directors’ & 
Officers’ Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 487–89 (2007)).  
19. Dana & Wiseman, supra note 10, at 56 (citations omitted) (“However, only one
state (Maryland) and no major unconventional oil and gas state has yet enacted a manda-
tory insurance requirement.”).  
20. Ctr. for Ins. Policy & Research, Hydraulic Fracturing, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. 
COMMISSIONERS, http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_hydraulic_fracturing.htm (last up-
dated Jan. 15, 2014).  
21. Bhavini Kamarshi et al., Fracking: Considerations for Risk Management and Fi-
nancing, MILLIMAN (June 21, 2012), http://www.milliman.com/insight/insurance/Fracking-
Considerations-for-risk-management-and-financing/. 
22. Mary Esch, Nationwide Insurance: Fracking Damage Won’t Be Covered,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 12, 2012, 7:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/13/ 
nationwide-insurance-fracking_n_1669775.html. 
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“[s]ome major global reinsurers . . . remain unwilling to take on 
fracking and well drilling risks in shale plays until operating, 
regulatory, and legal liability issues become clearer.”
23
 
 Yet even assuming that the basic CGL policy is available and 
purchased by companies involved in fracking, it is hardly clear 
that the basic coverage suffices to support strong risk-
management practices by drillers. Largely, this is because the 
basic CGL policy contains a “pollution exclusion” clause.
24
 And, as 
one insurance-industry white paper states: “Pollution and con-
tamination exclusions afford a strong basis to preclude coverage 
for claimed environmental damage related to fracking since ex-
clusions are unambiguous and enforceable in most circumstanc-
es.”
25
 
An endorsement that adds liability coverage for fracking opera-
tions, known as Environmental Impairment Liability (“EIL”) cov-
erage, is sometimes available.
26
 But as another insurance-
industry consultant states: “While a dozen or more large insurers 
will write EIL coverage for energy companies generally, only five 
or six will write . . . for well owners or contractors with significant 
fracking operations.”
27
 Although by one estimate 30% to 40% of 
the industry purchases EIL policies,
28
 “many decide against 
spending the money and rely instead on [CGL] policies.”
29
 Need-
less to say, a market-based regime based on liability insurance in 
the fracking industry is only as effective as the market penetra-
tion of meaningful liability insurance in the first place. 
Before leaving the topic of liability insurance, however, consid-
23. Peter Behr, Hydraulic Fracturing: Insurance Issues Loom over Shale Gas Devel-
opment, E&E NEWS: ENERGYWIRE (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/10599 
85449. 
24. See JONATHAN L.S. HODES, POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSES IN THE CGL POLICY: 
CURRENT ISSUES IN COVERAGE LITIGATION 1 (2009), available at http://www.cwilson.com/ 
publications/insurance/pollution-exclusion-clauses.pdf.  
25. NELSON LEVINE DE LUCA & HAMILTON, THE FUSS OVER FRACKING: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE INSURANCE ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH HYDRO-FRACKING 22 (2013), 
http://www.nldhlaw.com/content/uploads/2013/08/The-Fuss-Over-Fracking.pdf. 
26. Braden Reddall & Ben Berkowitz, Analysis: Insurers Find It Tough to Price Frack-
ing Risk, REUTERS (May 11, 2012, 3:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/11/us-
fracking-insurance-idUSBRE84A13R20120511.  
27. Douglas McLeod, Insurance Coverage Options for Fracking Risks Are Limited,
BUS. INS., (Feb. 24, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20130224/ 
NEWS07/302249991?tags=69|310|76|303.  
28. Id.
29. Id. (quoting Mike Schneider, president of Cravens Warren & Co., an insurance-
industry advising firm). 
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er briefly the converse of an insurance-as-regulation approach—
the extent to which the absence of liability insurance might send 
a proper market signal that improves the energy-water nexus. In 
doing so, consider the much wider connection between energy and 
water: that emissions of greenhouse gases from fossil-fuel-
powered electricity plants affect the climate with profound water-
related consequences.
30
 Alleging just such a connection, the Inu-
piat Native Alaskans in the village of Kivalina sued the AES 
Corporation (“AES”), a Virginia-based energy company, alleging 
that emissions from AES’s fossil-fuel-based plants had contribut-
ed to climate change that melted the sea ice adjacent to their 
coastal Alaskan town, leaving it vulnerable to significant erosion 
from ocean storm surges.
31
 As a matter of substantive environ-
mental law, the case has caused its own surge of commentary.
32
 
But, much less noticed is the insurance-law dispute that arose in 
the shadow of this litigation. 
 Upon being sued, AES asked its Virginia-based liability insur-
er, Steadfast Insurance Co., to provide a defense.
33
 After first fil-
ing a reservation of rights, Steadfast provided a defense, but then 
brought a declaratory judgment action claiming that “it did not 
owe AES a defense or indemnity coverage” under the policy.
34
 
Among the reasons given by the insurer was that the CGL poli-
cies only covered “occurrences,” defined as involving, “an accident, 
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the 
same general harmful condition.”
35
 The insurer argued that a 
30. See, e.g., Lenny Bernstein et al., Synthesis Report, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUPS I, II, AND III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF 
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 49, 50 (2007). 
31. See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868
(N.D. Cal. 2009). 
32. See, e.g., Ashley E. Breakfield, Note, Political Cases or Political Questions: The
Justiciability of Public Nuisance Climate Change Legislation and the Impact on Native 
Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, 17 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 39, 61 (2011) 
(suggesting that the Ninth Circuit should reverse the district court’s decisions in Ki-
valina); Nicole Johnson, In Brief, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp: Say 
Goodbye to Federal Public Nuisance Claims for Greenhouse Emissions, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
557, 558 (2013) (arguing that federal common law public nuisance claims for greenhouse 
gas emissions are no longer a viable avenue for seeking relief); Samantha Lawson, Note, 
The Conundrum of Climate Change Causation: Using Market Share Liability to Satisfy the 
Identification Requirement in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Co., 22 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 492 (2011) (suggesting that market share liability is appropriate for 
satisfying the identification requirement of causation in Kivalina).  
33. AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 725 S.E.2d 532, 533 (Va. 2012).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 534 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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power plant’s burning of greenhouse-gas-emitting fossil fuels was 
not an “occurrence,” and hence the insured’s liability for any re-
sulting damages was excluded from coverage.
36
 The Supreme 
Court of Virginia agreed, and held that the standard CGL policy 
would not consider the intentional burning of fossil fuels to be an 
“accident” that constituted an “occurrence” for which CGL policies 
provide coverage.
37
 
 As a matter of insurance-law doctrine, AES v. Steadfast is 
hardly assured of being followed. It is one thing to state that an 
insured intends to release greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, 
and even to attribute to the insured the knowledge that green-
house gases play some role in global warming and climate 
change, but something else to attribute to a Virginia-based fossil-
fuel-plant operator either the knowledge or intention to cause 
coastal erosion and flooding in a Native Alaskan village two-
thousand miles away. Whatever may be the challenges of the un-
derlying tort claims of plaintiffs bringing lawsuits against in-
sured energy generators (particularly as to the proximate-cause 
element),
38
 it has long been traditional insurance-law doctrine 
that the determination of whether a loss results from an “acci-
dent” is determined “from the point of view of the insured, wheth-
er the loss was unexpected, unusual and unforeseen.”
39
 Thus, as 
Douglas DeBaugh insightfully observes: “[T]he [AES v. Steadfast] 
court seems to make a critical (and perhaps liberal) inferential 
jump from an anticipated and probable increase in greenhouse 
gas in the atmosphere to . . . [an insured’s expectation of] erosion 
experienced by [the] Kivalina plaintiffs.”
40
 Perhaps for this rea-
36. See id. at 533.
37. Id. at 538.
38. See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, From Climate Change and Hurricanes to Ecological
Nuisances: Common Law Remedies for Public Law Failures?, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 565, 
601 (2011) (indicating that climate change plaintiffs may have difficulty meeting the prox-
imate cause element). But see Ken Alex, A Period of Consequences: Global Warming as 
Public Nuisance, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 94 n.88 (2007) (citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor 
Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)) (suggesting that proximate cause reflects what jus-
tice demands).   
39. Siagha v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 762 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47–48 (App. Div.
2003) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pitts-
burgh v. Terra Indus., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d 899, 919 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (“[W]here the in-
sured neither intended nor expected . . . the damage, [there] was an ‘occurrence.’”); Gibson 
v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 673 A.2d 1350, 1353 (Me. 1996) (noting that an “occurrence”
can follow even from an insured’s intentional act because the subsequent consequence
could be unintentional despite the act being intentional).
40. Douglas J. DeBaugh, Note, Marching Toward a Day of Reckoning: Dissecting the
Complex Intersection of Insurance Law and Climate Change Litigation Through AES Corp. 
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son, Justice Mims states in his concurrence in AES v. Steadfast: 
“Our jurisprudence . . . is leading inexorably to a day of reckoning 
that may surprise many policy holders [in Virginia].”
41
 
 As a matter of the insurance-energy nexus and the concept of 
insurance-as-governance, the implications of AES are even more 
significant. If widely followed, AES would insulate the entire lia-
bility-insurance industry from any financial responsibility for the 
climate-changing behavior of its insureds. From the standpoint of 
insureds, the “naked” liability they would face could be enormous. 
Nicholas Stern, the British economist, predicts that extreme 
weather alone could cause losses approaching 0.5–1% of global 
GDP by 2050.
42
 Potential losses have been estimated in the $850 
billion to $1.3 trillion range.
43
 And from the standpoint of insur-
ance-as-governance, without responsibility for these losses, liabil-
ity insurers would have little reason institutionally to develop 
climate-risk-reduction incentives for insureds. 
II. THE INSURANCE-ENERGY NEXUS: FIRST PARTY PROPERTY
INSURANCE 
 In fact, the claim that private third-party liability insurers 
would play a leading role in climate-change policy has never been 
certain. On the one hand, as the world’s largest industry, with 
$3.2 trillion in annual revenue,
44
 the insurance industry has been 
described as the world’s foremost “global integrator” of climate-
related impacts.
45
 Yet, on the other hand, even before AES v. 
Steadfast, the actual exposure of liability insurers for the climate-
change-causing conduct of their insureds has never been large.
46
 
v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 91 N.C. L. REV. (ADDENDUM) 95, 112 (2013).
41. 725 S.E.2d at 538 (Mims, J., concurring).
42. See DeBaugh, supra note 40, at 98 (citing NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE 
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE viii (2006)). 
43. Id. at 98 (citing Anastasia Telesetsky, Insurance as a Mitigation Mechanism:
Managing International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through Nationwide Mandatory Cli-
mate Change Catastrophe Insurance, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 691, 696 (2010)).  
44. See Evan Mills, Insurance in a Climate of Change, 309 SCI. 1040, 1040 (2005) (“As
the world’s largest industry [[the insurance industry] would be the third largest country if 
its $3.2 trillion in yearly revenues were compared with national gross domestic products 
(GDPs)] . . . .”).  
45. Id. (endnote omitted) (“The insurance sector is a lightning rod, serving as global
integrator of impacts across all sectors of the economy, and messenger of these impacts 
through the terms and price signals it projects to its customers.”).  
46. Cf. David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in
Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1744 (2007) (“We are aware of four 
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Rather, many of the climate-related losses shouldered by insurers 
have come from first-party insurance, such as from homeowners’ 
and other forms of property coverage.
47
 
 That said, the actual exposure of first-party insurers to cli-
mate-related risks is at best described as a work in progress and 
at worst understood as a game of musical chairs in which proper-
ty insurers make sure that they are not left standing when the 
music stops. Since 1968, private first-party homeowners insur-
ance has included a standard exclusion for “any loss” from “flood, 
surface water, waves, tidal waves, overflow of a body of water, 
[and] spray from these, whether or not driven by wind.”
48
 Insurers 
have done this not only because flooding is a correlated risk, the 
costs of which are more difficult to spread among a pool of in-
sureds than randomized individual risks, but also because of the 
adverse-selection risks of a market for flood insurance drawn 
primarily from those who feel themselves most likely to be flood-
ed.
49
 Instead, since 1968, the federal government has been forced 
to provide flood insurance through the National Flood Insurance 
Program (“NFIP”), a role it undertook partly as a way to reduce 
the federal government’s growing outlays for disaster assistance.
50
 
Technically, that leaves the standard (private) homeowners policy 
to cover losses due to “wind,” including wind-caused losses from 
extreme weather, but other provisions in most of these policies 
draw arcane distinctions about causation that lead to perennial 
“wind versus water” litigation in the wake of most extreme 
[climate tort actions against private parties], but observers . . . expect the number to in-
crease significantly.”).  
47. E.g., Christina Ross, Evan Mills & Sean B. Hecht, Limiting Liability in the Green-
house: Insurance Risk-Management Strategies in the Context of Global Climate Change, 
26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 251, 277 (2007) (“[A] major portion of the $20.8 billion in total in-
sured commercial losses from Hurricane Katrina were due to business interruptions.”).  
48. See, e.g., Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684, 689 (S.D.
Miss. 2006); cf. Jay S. Goldbaum, Katrina and Beyond: Judicial Treatment of Boilerplate 
Language in Standardized Insurance Contracts, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 453, 476–77 
(2007).  
49. See, e.g., Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market
Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 7 (2006) (“[Flood insurance] suffers from 
unusual demand- and supply-side constraints that make it a relatively difficult market for 
insurers, and they have responded rationally by avoiding it.”).  
50. Id. at 12 (“NFIP-backed insurance was conceived of as a way of inducing commu-
nities to adopt flood mitigation policies that the federal government . . . could not com-
pel.”); see also Sandra Leon & Sandy Lubin, FEMA: Federal Disaster Relief, 17 GEN. 
PRAC., SOLO & SMALL FIRM DIV. MAG. (American Bar Association), July–Aug. 2000, at 7 
(communities that do not participate in NFIP are ineligible to participate in several of 
FEMA’s disaster-assistance programs).  
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weather events, such as hurricanes, in which both wind and 
flooding occur.
51
 
 Even more to the point, in recent years private insurers have 
increasingly been abandoning coverage for wind losses just as 
they abandoned the market for flood insurance during the 
1960s.
52
 Generally, they do this because state insurance regula-
tors do not approve sufficient “rate” to make full coverage of wind 
losses profitable.
53
 Those insurers who do not leave the market al-
together, offer instead “hollowed out” coverage: reducing the are-
as where they remain willing to offer coverage, reducing the max-
imum amounts of coverage they are prepared to offer, and, as to 
whatever insurance that is placed, forcing insureds to bear more 
of the wind-related risks of storms through higher deductibles 
and co-insurance.
54
 Increasingly, in place of private wind cover-
age, insureds rely on state-run wind pools; entities that bear a 
conceptual similarity to the governmental insurance offered for 
flood via the NFIP. Unlike the NFIP, however, state wind pools 
“typically reflect the structure of residual high-risk insurance en-
tities in which the state conditions the right to sell insurance 
within the state with forced participation” in catastrophic wind 
coverage.
55
 In short, except to the extent they are forced to partic-
ipate in such wind pools, increasingly Nationwide is no longer on 
51. See, e.g., Donald T. Hornstein, The Balkanization of CAT Property Insurance: Fi-
nancing and Fragmentation in Storm Risks, 11 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 17–21 (2013) 
(describing litigation under so-called “anti-concurrent-cause” clauses).   
52. Id. at 23.
53. See id. at 26. For example, “[in] 2008, coastal homeowners’ coverage in North Car-
olina became a public policy issue when Farmers Insurance decided to withdraw from 
property insurance statewide rather than participate in what it believed to be a system of 
actuarially unfair rates.” Id. at 26 n.92; see Brian H. Kern, Farmers Insurance to Pull Out 
of North Carolina Homeowners’ Market, INS. J. (Aug. 14, 2008), http://www.insurance 
journal.com/news/southeast/2008/08/14/92787.htm. Similarly, in 2011, the North Carolina 
Farm Bureau Insurance Co. significantly reduced its dwelling policy coverage at the coast, 
again because of what it believed to be insufficient rates. See Michael Adams, North Caro-
lina Farm Bureau to Raise Homeowners’ Rates, Drop Policies, INS. J. (Feb. 27, 2012), http: 
//www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2012/02/27/237291.htm. 
54. See J. ROBERT HUNTER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY’S 
INCREDIBLE DISAPPEARING WEATHER CATASTROPHE RISK: HOW INSURERS HAVE SHIFTED 
RISK AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH WEATHER CATASTROPHES TO CONSUMERS AND 
TAXPAYERS 4–5 (Feb. 17, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Insurance 
RegulationHurricaneRiskDisappearingCoverageStudy2-12.pdf; see also Hornstein, supra 
note 51, at 26 n.92. For example, Allstate, which dropped approximately 320,000 policies 
in Florida since 2004, is no longer offering any private homeowners coverage in the state. 
Id. When four hurricanes hit Florida in 2004, even those who had insurance bore between 
15% and 20% of the financial losses. Id. at 26. 
55. Hornstein, supra note 51, at 51.
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your side, Allstate has withdrawn its good hands, and State 
Farm, unlike a good neighbor, is not there. 
 The result is that, although the first-party (property) insur-
ance industry regularly refers to the growing cost of covering 
weather-related catastrophes, it has taken measures to shift that 
loss to others.
56
 Thus, the NFIP, which until recently often offered 
coverage at subsidized, below-cost rates, has since 2006 been 
forced to borrow over $30 billion from the U.S. Treasury to cover 
costs.
57
 Since 1989, Congress has been forced to enact over $410 
billion in catastrophe-related emergency supplemental appropria-
tions.
58
 Aggregating what it terms “climate disruption costs,” the 
Natural Resources Defense Council recently concluded that Unit-
ed States taxpayers outspend private insurers three-to-one to 
cover such costs.
59
 
 Ironically, it is against this background of fading insurance 
coverage, at least as to private catastrophe coverage, that we may 
be on the verge of a natural experiment of the insurance-as-
governance hypothesis. This is because Congress, in summer 
2012, enacted the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 
2012 (“Biggert-Waters”),
60
 the most significant revision of the 
NFIP in a generation.
61
 Supported by a mix of balanced-budget-
minded conservatives and environmentally-minded progressives, 
Biggert-Waters sought to eliminate price subsidies for flood in-
surance.
62
 It did this by requiring actuarially fair rates for all 
newly purchased properties
63
 and by phasing out subsidies for 
second homes, business properties, severe repetitive-loss proper-
56. See, e.g., HUNTER, supra note 54, at 1.
57. See DANIEL LASHOF & ANDY STEVENSON, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, NRDC
ISSUE PAPER IP:13-05A, WHO PAYS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE? 8 (2013), available at http: 
//www. nrdc.org/globalwarming/files/taxpayer-climate-costs-IP.pdf. 
58. Id. at 6 (footnote omitted) (“Since 1989, Congress has passed emergency supple-
mental appropriations totaling in excess of $410 billion in 2012 dollars, with more than 
$140 billion authorized over the past 10 years alone, largely due to the 2005 hurricane 
season ($55.9 billion) and Hurricane Sandy ($50.7 billion).”). 
59. Id. at 3 (noting that of the $139 billion in climate-related damages in the United
States in 2012, private insurers covered only about 25% ($33 billion) of these costs). 
60. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126
Stat. 916 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4129 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)). 
61. See, e.g., Eli Lehrer, Strange Bedfellows: SmarterSafer.org and the Biggert-Waters
Act of 2012, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 351, 352 (2013) (footnote omitted) (“The Big-
gert-Waters Act may well be the largest revamping of the flood insurance program since 
its origin in 1968.”).  
62. Id. at 351, 353.
63. § 100205(a)(1)(B), 126 Stat. at 917 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(g)).
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ties, and homes substantially rebuilt after losses.
64
 Rates for pri-
mary residences that had been based on risks of flooding from 
maps prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(“FEMA”), and that had previously been “grandfathered” even 
when FEMA’s newer maps revealed increased flooding risks, 
were to increase by 20% annually until their rates reflected the 
actuarial risk.
65
 And FEMA was allocated $400 million annually 
to increase its flood-mapping capacity, with Biggert-Waters re-
quiring FEMA to produce or revise flood maps, using the “most 
accurate topography and elevation data” for all areas within 100-
year and 500-year floodplains.
66
 
 In the fifteen months following its enactment in July 2012, 
Biggert-Waters became strong evidence of the insurance-as-
governance hypothesis, and of the idea that, to use the phrase 
coined by Professor Adam Scales, the United States electorate 
had become “a nation of policyholders” as much as it was a nation 
of citizens.
67
 On October 29, 2012, the East Coast was hit by Su-
perstorm Sandy, the strongest storm of the 2012 hurricane sea-
son and the second-worst storm, in terms of financial loss, in 
American history.
68
 FEMA, unable to cover flood losses with its 
then-underfinanced NFIP revenue base, was forced to request 
over $50 billion in supplemental appropriations from Congress; a 
request that prompted resistance from budget-minded conserva-
tives and renewed agreement that Congress had wisely passed 
Biggert-Waters to shore up NFIP finances.
69
 Yet, especially in the 
64. § 100205(a)(1)(A), 126 Stat. at 917 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4014(a)(2)) (elimi-
nation of special subsidies); see also § 100205(c)(3), 126 Stat. at 918–19 (to be codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 4015(e)(2)) (specified rate-increase provisions).  
65. § 100207, 126 Stat. at 919 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4015(h)) (“Any increase in
the risk premium rate charged for flood insurance on any property that is covered by a 
flood insurance policy on the effective date of such an update that is a result of such up-
dating shall be phased in over a 5-year period, at the rate of 20 percent for each year fol-
lowing such effective date.”).  
66. § 100216(b), 126 Stat. at 927–28 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4101(a)–(b)) (man-
dating ongoing program between Administrator and a Technical Mapping Advisory Coun-
cil to review, update, and maintain NFIP rate maps with respect to the 100-year flood-
plain, the 500-year floodplain, areas of residual risk, areas that could be inundated in case 
of failed flood control structures, and the level of protection provided by such structures); § 
100216(f), 126 Stat. at 930 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4101b(f)) (allocating $400 million 
annually between 2013 and 2017 to support FEMA’s flood-mapping capacity).  
67. See Scales, supra note 49, at 47.
68. See David Porter, Hurricane Sandy Was Second-Costliest in U.S. History, Report
Shows, HUFFINGTON POST GREEN (Feb. 12, 2013, 10:32 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/2013/02/12/hurricane-sandy-second-costliest_n_2669686.html.  
69. See, e.g., Raymond Hernandez, Hurricane Relief Bill Clears Hurdle in the Senate,
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immediate rebuilding aftermath of Superstorm Sandy, the finan-
cial impact of the Biggert-Waters rate increases began to attract 
significant attention in the press. In mid-December 2012, FEMA 
released new flood maps (the first change to New Jersey flood 
maps in a generation)
70
 that caused highly publicized sticker 
shock by already devastated Superstorm Sandy victims looking to 
rebuild their homes. No longer protected (“grandfathered”) by low 
rates set under previous maps,
71
 some homeowners faced the pro-
spect of a ten-fold increase in annual premiums in order to pur-
chase the maximum NFIP coverage of $250,000 for structures.
72
 
There began what the press described as a “revolution” by policy-
holders against the new Biggert-Waters rates.
73
 
 Perhaps because most Biggert-Waters rate increases were not 
scheduled to take effect until October 2013, there was no acute 
political reaction to FEMA’s newly released flood maps and the 
agency’s corresponding new schedule of rate increases. In Janu-
ary 2013, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie announced that he 
would not challenge the new maps and the higher rates they 
presaged.
74
 But as more policyholders began to appreciate the 
significance of the rate increases, political opposition began to 
grow. An organization called “StopFEMANow” was created as a 
Facebook Page by George Kasimos, a New Jersey resident affect-
ed by Superstorm Sandy, and, in September 2013, on the eve of 
the new NFIP rate increases, it successfully organized protests by 
hundreds of outraged policyholders in fifteen locations across ten 
states.
75
 Indeed, a speech given on behalf of this grass-roots or-
ganization reflects perfectly the insurance-as-governance claim 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2012, at A23. 
70. See, e.g., Gina Columbus, N.J. Officials Assess New Flood Maps in Sandy’s Wake,
USA TODAY (Dec. 16, 2012, 8:28 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/ 
12/16/new-nj-flood-maps/1773733/; Stephen Stirling, Jersey Shore Revolution Begins, as 
FEMA Releases New Flood Maps, NJ.COM (Dec. 16, 2012, 8:10 AM), http://www.nj.com/ 
news/index.ssf/2012/12/jersey_shore_revolution_begins.html. 
71. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Les Christie, Flood Insurance Costs Soaring for Thousands of Homeown-
ers, CNN MONEY (Oct. 21, 2013, 4:57 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/10/21/real_estate/ 
flood-insurance/.  
73. See, e.g., Stirling, supra note 70.
74. See Edward Van Embden, New Jersey to Adopt FEMA’s Flood Elevation Maps,
Christie Says, TOMS RIVER PATCH (New Jersey) (Jan. 25, 2013, 12:55 AM), http://tomsriv 
er.patch.com/groups/politics-and-elections/p/new-jersey-to-adopt-fema-s-flood-elevation-
maps-christie-says. 
75. See Tracey Samuelson, Stop FEMA Now Hopes to Take Flood Reform Movement
National, NEWSWORKS (Sept. 29, 2013), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local/new-jer 
sey/60340-stop-fema-now. 
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that insurance is increasingly treated as government itself. It be-
gins with “We the people,” and then makes its central claim, that 
“[t]he American dream is becoming our nightmare as our rights to 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are now in jeopardy by 
our own government’s ludicrous demands of increases in flood in-
surance premiums of 500% or more.”
76
 By May 2013, Governor 
Christie caught this shift in the political winds and announced 
his opposition to the NFIP rate increases,
77
 as did Congresswom-
an Maxine Waters, the co-author of the Biggert-Waters legisla-
tion.
78
 In October 2013, legislation to delay the FEMA rate in-
creases for four years was introduced in the Senate by Mary 
Landrieu (Democrat, Louisiana)
79
 and, not to be undone, in the 
House of Representatives by her expected opponent in the 2016 
election, Representative Bill Cassidy (Republican, Baton Rouge).
80
 
In late December 2013, the Tampa Bay Times called the impend-
ing NFIP rate increases one of the “top stories of the year.”
81
 
As this essay goes to press, it seems as if most of the Biggert-
Waters rate increases will proceed as scheduled. Neither the 
Landrieu nor the Cassidy bill has been passed by Congress.
82
 On 
January 16, 2014, Congress enacted an omnibus $1.1 trillion 
budget bill that would leave almost all Biggert-Waters rate in-
creases untouched, save for an eight-month delay in increased 
rates for previously-grandfathered, current homeowners whose 
76. Michael P. Coyne, Stop FEMA Now, Speech, available at http://www.stopfe
manow.com/about/ (follow “speech from Michael P. Coyne” hyperlink). 
77. See Scott Gurian, Explainer: Putting Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act
in Perspective, NJSPOTLIGHT (Nov. 12,  2013),  http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/13/11/ 
11/explainer-putting-biggert-waters-flood-insurance-reform-act-in-perspective/ (“Governor 
Chris Christie . . . wrote to Congress last May, [expressing that] ‘foisting the additional 
burden of a flood-insurance rate increase on home and business owners as currently pro-
posed would be financially devastating.’”).  
78. Id. (“Congresswoman Maxine Waters—who coauthored the original Act—now says
she’s outraged by the insurance premium increases many homeowners are facing, and 
that she never intended for that to occur.”).  
79. See Landrieu, Bipartisan Coalition to Introduce Flood Insurance Reform Bill,
MARY LANDRIEU (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.landrieu.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=40 
23. 
80. See Jordan Blum, Cassidy Files Flood Insurance Bill, THE ADVOCATE (Jan. 6,
2014), http://theadvocate.com/home/7820103-125/cassidy-files-flood-insurance-bill. 
81. 2013: Top Stories of the Year, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 27, 2013, 11:21 PM), http://
www.tampabay.com/news/2013/2158824. 
82. Flood Insurance Relief and Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 3693, 113th Cong.
(2013); S. 996, 113th Cong. (2013). On January 30, 2014, the Senate passed the Landrieu 
bill by a vote of 67 to 32. Press Release, Senator Mary Landrieu, Senate Passes Compre-
hensive Bill Delaying Flood Insurance Rate Hikes (Jan. 30, 2014), available at http: 
//www.landrieu.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=4201. 
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rates would otherwise increase due to the greater flooding risks 
revealed by FEMA’s new flood maps.
83
 There are announcements 
by members of Congress in both parties that additional legisla-
tion will be introduced seeking broader, and deeper, rollbacks of 
Biggert-Waters rate increases,
84
 but House Speaker John Boehner 
has gone on record stating that the House will “not take up” legis-
lation that would delay the Biggert-Waters rate reforms.
85
 
CONCLUSION 
 The central point of this essay is that insurance has a role to 
play, both as an institution and as a policy instrument, in debates 
about the energy-water nexus. There is no more important debate 
on this topic than the overarching one about the connections be-
tween our continued dependence on fossil fuels and the climate-
change consequences it causes. Recently, commentators have be-
moaned both a lack of political attention to climate change
86
 and a 
lack of serious press coverage of the issue.
87
 What this commen-
tary misses, however, is that a significant part of popular debate 
on this issue is now taking place in the arena of insurance law 
and policy. It is still too early to predict whether political and 
83. See Andrew G. Simpson, Congressional Spending Plan Would Curb Some Flood
Insurance Rates, INS. J. (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/ 
2014/01/15/317118.htm (stating that the budget language will block FEMA from spending 
funds for the remainder of the fiscal year, through September 30, 2014, to enforce higher 
premiums on currently “grandfathered” properties that otherwise would have seen their 
rates increase under Section 207 of the Biggert-Waters Act).  
84. See, e.g., Kimberly Railey, Congress Scrambles as Coastal Residents Rail at Insur-
ance Rates, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 19, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2014/ 
01/19/massachusetts-lawmakers-seek-boost-taxpayer-subsidies-for-coastal-flood-insurance 
/UpPekn4O8DBJq8ZWvPXNNL/story.html (“Members of Congress from coastal states in-
cluding Massachusetts are banding together across party lines to respond to a rising tide 
of constituent complaints and reverse increases in federal flood insurance premiums man-
dated by a bill passed in 2012. . . . The Senate could vote this month on a measure to re-
store the full subsidies and delay the increases for another four years.”). 
85. See Bruce Alpert, House Speaker Boehner Says House Won’t Take Up Bill on 4-
Year Delay in Flood Insurance Increases, But More Modest Change Possible, NOLA.COM 
(Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/01/speaker_boehner_says_hou 
se_won.html. 
86. See, e.g., Dana R. Fisher et al., Mapping the Ideological Networks of American
Climate Politics, 116 CLIMATIC CHANGE 523, 524–25 (2013). 
87. See, e.g., Margaret Sullivan, After Changes, How Green is the Times?, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2013, at SR12; Laura Santhanam, Study: How Broadcast News Covered Climate 
Change in the Last Five Years, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA (Jan. 16, 2014), http://media 
matters.org/research/2014/01/16/study-how-broadcast-news-covered-climate-change/1976 
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market feedback from the insurance debate will directly affect 
policy discussions about alternative energy sources, improved en-
ergy efficiency, the unequal distribution of risks caused by cli-
mate change, and a host of other topics. But one thing is quite 
clear. Currently, one aspect of the climate that people and politi-
cians are intensely discussing involves the immediate and highly 
salient costs, both to individual incomes and national budgets, of 
doing nothing to ameliorate the growing costs of climate-related 
catastrophes. In fact, precisely as the insurance-as-governance 
literature would predict, the debate over insurance is on the front 
lines in the national discussion about climate and the energy-
water nexus. 
